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and British University Students

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Abstract

This study extends the literature on attitudes toward gender roles by exploring whether the nature of sexism (i.e., benevolence and hostility directed at men) differs among university students from two under-researched countries, Poland (n=190) and South Africa (n=188), in a comparison with students in the United Kingdom (n=166). Based on empirical literature applying Ambivalent Sexism Theory, and in the light of the socio-political context, it was hypothesized that: (1) both hostile and benevolent attitudes toward men in Poland would be more liberal than in South Africa and more conservative than in the United Kingdom, and (2), women would exhibit more hostile but less benevolent attitudes than men in relatively more conservative South Africa. The Ambivalence to Men Inventory was used to measure the two types of sexist attitudes about men. Findings supported the first hypothesis for hostile attitudes and partially for benevolent attitudes. South African and Polish students were more benevolent and hostile to men than British students, and students from South Africa were more hostile than those from Poland. Moreover, as predicted, a significant country-by-gender interaction revealed that South African women had more hostile and less benevolent attitudes to men than South African men. No such gender gap was present in the case of hostile attitudes in Poland and benevolent attitudes in the United Kingdom. Findings are discussed in terms of Ambivalent Sexism Theory and the countries' socio-cultural context.

Keywords: ambivalent sexism, gender attitudes; Poland, United Kingdom, South Africa

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Ambivalence toward Men: Comparing Sexism among Polish, South African, and British University Students

Introduction

This paper sets out to address a number of gaps in the cross-cultural literature on sexism. Uniquely, it compares attitudes to men in three countries—Poland, South Africa and the United Kingdom—and analyses them in light of socio-political context. Poland and South Africa represent two under-researched countries undergoing transition to democracy (Lewicka, 2005; Hassin, 2002) and are compared against stable democracy of the United Kingdom. We argue that the different nature of the transition contributes toward the distinct patterns of sexism observed in these countries today. Specifically, we discuss the varied emphasis on gender equality policies in the countries' history of transition: history of legalized inequality in South Africa (Hassim, 2005) vs. forced emancipation of communism in Poland (LaFont, 2001). Thus, and of interest to cross-cultural researchers, this paper illustrates the importance of taking socio-political context into consideration when attempting to understand sexism. Moreover, we focus on attitudes to men rather than women, which are somewhat neglected in the literature (Glick, 2004). This paper also recognizes the multi-dimensional and ambivalent, rather than one-dimensional and exclusively negative, nature of sexism (Glick et al., 2004). In doing so, we expand upon existing knowledge concerning sexism cross-culturally.

Sexism—sexist or traditional gender attitudes—is defined as a dominant traditional set of ideologies whose function is to maintain gender inequality (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; Glick, et al., 2004; Viki & Abrams, 2004). On the other hand, egalitarianism—egalitarian or liberal gender attitudes—can be understood as an antonym of sexism: ideologies that promote gender equality (McDaniel, 2008). Over the past two decades, ample research has investigated such gender attitudes cross-culturally through the use of mostly student samples

recruited across five continents (i.e., 16 nations, Glick, et al., 2004; 14 nations, Williams & Best, 1982; Williams, Satterwhite, & Best, 1999). However, whilst many studies have examined attitudes toward women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, student and non-student U.S. samples; Glick, et al., 2000, a mixture of representative and student samples from 19 countries; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995, U.S. student samples; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995, male student and male worker samples from Canada; Twenge, 2001, U.S. student samples), only a few have focused on attitudes toward men (Glick & Fiske, 1999, U.S. student and older adults samples; Glick, et al., 2004). In addition, the majority of those studies treated these attitudes as a global construct and did not distinguish between hostile and benevolent sexism, thus limiting our understanding of the exact nature of sexism (with the exception of two cross-cultural investigations on mainly student samples by Glick, et al., 2004; and Glick, et al., 2000; and Yakushko, 2005 on Ukrainian college students and young professionals).

According to Ambivalent Sexism Theory (AST, Glick, 2004; Glick, et al., 2000), traditional—or sexist—gender attitudes are not one-dimensional in nature but ambivalent. Cross-culturally, they consist of both hostile and benevolent components, whose coexistence results in general ambivalence. The function of both types of attitudes serves hierarchy stabilization (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; Glick, et al., 2004; Viki & Abrams, 2004) in private and public spheres alike (Glick & Fiske, 2001b). Hostile attitudes indicate antipathy toward men (Hostility to Men, HM) or women (Hostile Sexism, HS), whilst benevolent attitudes are characterized by positive but still patronising beliefs about certain groups of men (Benevolence to Men, BM) or women (Benevolent Sexism, BS) (Becker, 2010; Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007; Sibley & Wilson, 2004). As the understanding and manifestation of sexism have been changing from more overt to more subtle forms (Glick & Fiske, 1996,

1999; Swim, et al., 2005, U.S. student sample), investigating both overt hostile and more subtle benevolent aspects of sexism is crucial in cross-cultural comparisons.

Since the United Kingdom has consistently scored amongst the most egalitarian countries across five continents on both one-dimensional measures of sexism (Williams & Best, 1990, mostly student samples from 14 countries) as well as on benevolent and hostile attitudes to men (Glick, et al., 2004, mainly student samples from 16 nations) and women (Glick, et al., 2000, mixture of representative and student samples from 19 countries), it has been included in the present investigation as a reference point for the more under-researched countries: Poland and South Africa. Neither of the latter countries was included in Glick et al.'s (2004) investigation on ambivalent attitudes toward men.

Crucially, in the case of this paper, while AST predicts different shape of gender gap depending on the type of sexism and the national level of gender inequality (men underscoring women on HM but outscoring them on BM, particularly in countries with high gender inequality, Glick et al., 2004) the theory is limited in predicting the national level of sexism in the first place. This paper is among the first to offer analysis of countries' socio-political context as a way to address this issue. Specifically, different emphasis on gender equality in Poland and South Africa during their transition to democracy over the past 20 years (i.e. history of legalized inequality in South Africa vs. forced emancipation of communism in Poland; Hassim, 2005; LaFont, 2001) is argued to be useful in accounting for differing degrees of sexism nationally (higher in South Africa than in Poland). Moreover, socio-political context is also useful in explaining some unexpected findings, from AST's point of view, concerning the shape of the gender gap (or lack of it) on particular types of sexism. Such an analysis goes beyond AST and may enrich our understanding of how different types of sexism function to maintain the status quo in different countries. Thus, analysis of sexism in countries undergoing transition may be especially informative of how

socio-political context relates to gender attitudes. Two key questions are examined: (1) What is the nature of attitudes toward men in Poland and South Africa as compared to those in the United Kingdom?; and (2), How do men compare to women regarding their attitudes toward men in each of the three countries? Additionally, our data concerning attitudes toward men in the United Kingdom will enable indirect confirmation of previous findings concerning the country's relative gender egalitarianism.

Nature of Sexism in Poland, South Africa and the United Kingdom

The first question investigated in the current paper is how the two under-researched countries, Poland and South Africa, compare to the relatively egalitarian United Kingdom in their sexist attitudes toward men. Since research applying AST has shown that ambivalent sexism correlates positively and significantly with social indicators of equality, such as the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM, e.g., women's presence in elite occupations and roles) and the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI, e.g., women's overall standard of living), one could argue that sexist attitudes in the three countries might be predicted based upon such socio-economic indices. However, the latest Human Development Report ("United Nations Development Programme", 2009) returns contradictory results. Whilst the latest GEM analysis ranks the United Kingdom as most egalitarian (15th worldwide; 0.79), followed by South Africa (26th worldwide; 0.687) and then Poland (38th worldwide; 0.631), the most recent GDI analysis ranks the United Kingdom as most egalitarian (17th worldwide; 0.943), followed by Poland (39th worldwide; 0.877) and then South Africa (109th worldwide; 0.680). The observed variation might partly be due to the different, yet related, aspects of equality these indices capture (i.e., women's occupational and managerial roles for GEM vs. women's general standard of living for GDI). However, it may also indicate, as Bhana, Zimmerman, and Cupp (2008, p. 118) argue, "that great variability exists in how gender role attitudes are enacted. This is likely to be even more complex in a society in

1 transition..." such as Poland and South Africa. Indeed, out of the three countries, the United
2 Kingdom is the only one which scores consistently as highly egalitarian on both socio-
3 economic indices such as GDI and GEM and on psychological measures such as gender
4 attitudes or ambivalent sexism as shown above.

5 Interestingly, the United Kingdom is also the most mature democracy of the three
6 countries (spanning 300 years, compared to some 20 years in Poland and South Africa). It
7 also is considered to be amongst the most developed countries in the world, with a long
8 history of modernization—a factor argued to contribute significantly to gender equality
9 worldwide (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Indeed, the feminism movement in the United
10 Kingdom dates back to 1800, even though *full* women's suffrage was not achieved until
11 1928; this compared to 1918 in Poland and 1994 in South Africa when the initial suffrage
12 granted to White women in 1930 was extended to include Black women. But full gender
13 equality has arguably still not been achieved in the United Kingdom. Some sources report a
14 marked slowdown in egalitarian trends since the early '80s (Blau, Brinton, & Grusky, 2006;
15 Dorius & Alwin, 2010; Scott, 2006) and even debate the possibility of trend reversal or a
16 return to sexism (Braun & Scott, 2009; Crompton, Brockmann, & Lyonette, 2005; Walter,
17 2010). Pessimists argue that further development of gender equality is unlikely due to the
18 asymmetry in adopting new gender roles, with women's increased participation in male-
19 dominated jobs not matched by an increase in men's participation in sharing household
20 responsibilities (England, 2006). Thus, there is a need to continuously monitor the level of
21 sexism in the relatively egalitarian United Kingdom.

22 Poland and South Africa, being in transition, represent intriguing cases for those
23 interested in cross-cultural attitudes toward male gender roles. Gender attitudes in these
24 countries are arguably in a state of flux because of dramatic contemporary economic,
25 political, and social changes (Lewicka, 2005). There are important similarities as well as

1 differences between these two countries. Both countries are amongst the biggest and fastest-
2 developing in their respective regions. Dynamic socio-economic changes, a long history
3 fighting for independence, and a relatively youthful fully democratic system established in
4 the early '90s may be listed amongst the similarities between these otherwise culturally very
5 different countries. Notably, the transition has taken somewhat different routes in each of
6 these countries, which might have affected gender attitudes in different ways.

7 Over the past two decades, South Africa has undergone a transition from apartheid to
8 majority political rule which culminated in democratic elections in 1994. In South Africa's
9 case, and in contrast to other African countries, the transition to democracy led to placing
10 (gender) equality concerns into the centre of democratic debates (Hassim, 2002). Feminist
11 participation in processes of transition has resulted in greater legal and political equality for
12 women (Hassim, 2005). This is evidenced constitutionally as well as legislatively in women's
13 relatively strong representation within government (Waylen, 2004). It is also indexed by the
14 GEM. However, cultural and social gender equality is less easily evidenced.

15 Although South Africa's transition to democracy has been perceived as a success story
16 in gender terms, this progress is relative. Apartheid's legacy of deeply rooted and
17 institutionalized inequality marks the starting point for changes toward the full democracy
18 which followed. Indeed, power remains unevenly distributed in this highly stratified society.
19 With regard to gender equality, Shefer et al. (2008) interviewed a sample of men and women
20 in the Western Cape and report that although a clear shift in gender relations has taken place,
21 with women gaining power, this process has not been absolute and complete. Women and
22 men in the Western Cape province continue to construct their gender identities and roles in
23 terms of traditional gender relations of dominance and subservience. Mantell et al. (2009)
24 similarly report tensions between changing gender norms in post-apartheid South Africa
25 which recognise women's rights (or lack thereof) and traditional gender norms acting to limit

1 such freedoms. Dadoo and Frost (2008, pp. 432-433), based on an overview of the literature
2 on sub-Saharan Africa, make an even stronger statement that “pervasive gender inequality is
3 intimately intertwined in the fabric of sub-Saharan African society.” Gender conservatism has
4 also been evidenced recently in a study of gender representation in television advertising in
5 this country (Luyt, 2011).

6 How, then, would South African attitudes toward men compare to those in the United
7 Kingdom? Although research on ambivalent attitudes toward *men* did not include South
8 Africa (Glick, et al., 2004), in earlier cross-cultural investigations on ambivalence toward
9 *women* (Glick, et al., 2000), as well as on one-dimensional attitudes to women (Williams &
10 Best, 1990), South Africa scored amongst the most conservative countries out of the 16 and
11 14 nations respectively. Crucially, Glick et al. (2004) showed that ambivalent attitudes
12 toward women (i.e., HS and BS) correlate highly, significantly, and positively with attitudes
13 toward men (i.e., HM and BM) in most of the 16 countries for male participants (exceptions
14 being Portugal and Syria) and in all 16 countries for female participants. This finding
15 confirmed the AST’s prediction that HM and BM, as well as HS and BS, are complementary
16 gender ideologies which function to maintain the status quo. Thus, although South Africa was
17 not included amongst these 16 countries, the reviewed literature consistently reports that it is
18 more gender conservative than the United Kingdom. Even though the data refers largely to
19 attitudes to women, AST states that both forms of ambivalent attitudes (i.e., those directed at
20 men and women) are compatible ideologies which aim to maintain the status quo (Glick &
21 Fiske, 2001a). This has been supported by robust cross-cultural correlations between HS and
22 HM as well as BS and BM (Glick, et al. 2004). Thus, based on AST, and the long history of
23 inequality endured in South Africa, as compared to long history of democracy in the United
24 Kingdom, it could be predicted that participants in South Africa should score higher than the
25 British sample on both HM and BM.

Predicting how Poland would compare to the United Kingdom and South Africa on attitudes toward men is difficult because of a lack of data on Poland in both of Glick et al.'s (2000, 2004) cross-cultural studies on ambivalent sexism. Its historical and socio-political background makes Poland a mixed constellation of factors which may influence gender attitudes in conflicting ways. Its transition to democracy had a different starting point, and thus nature, from South Africa's. Historically, democracy in Poland was preceded by communism rather than by a period of legalized inequality. Communist values were informed by idealistic Marxist and Leninist theories of women's equality (Yakushko, 2005) and were thus egalitarian in nature. Indeed, they were manifested in '80s statistics unheard of in the democratic West: close to 90% participation of working-age women in the employment market and 30% of seats in governing bodies guaranteed to women via a system of quotas (LaFont, 2001; Pollert, 2003; Seguino, 2007). However, this (seeming) emancipation in the public sphere was not accompanied by equality in the domestic sphere (Shafiro, Himelein, & Best, 2003). Women experienced the so-called 'triple burden': they were expected to perform the roles of worker, mother and social activist (LaFont, 2001). Hence, the transition into (male) democracy in 1989 was marked by rejection of communist ideas (including the politically imposed women's emancipation), reinforcement of motherhood, loss of the few benefits women had, and remasculinisation of the system (LaFont, 2001; Pollert, 2003; Seguino, 2007; Yakushko, 2005).

Thus, conflicting forces are at work in Poland. On the one hand, more liberal gender roles are facilitated by the process of progressive modernization (Inglehart & Norris, 2003) and the individualistic values promoted by (patriarchal) capitalism (Gibbons, Stiles, & Shokodriani, 1991). On the other hand, traditional division of labour and power between Polish men and women is reinforced by the rejection of egalitarian communist ideas and encouraged by the dominant Catholic Church promoting strong traditional family values

(Robila & Krishnakumar, 2004). This mixture of factors might have, at least in part, contributed to the contradictory findings returned by GEM and GDI mentioned earlier ("United Nations Development Programme", 2009). Thus, it is important to turn from socio-economic indices of gender egalitarianism (e.g., GEM or GDI) to psychological ones such as direct measures of gender attitudes.

Central and Eastern European countries have been included in few psychological cross-cultural studies which used such direct measures (e.g., Frieze, et al., 2003, Slovenian, Croatian and U.S. student samples; Levant, et al., 2003, Russian and U.S. young men and women; Shafiro, et al., 2003, Ukrainian and U.S. female students) and have demonstrated their greater gender conservatism as compared to Western nations. On the whole, studies of this sort have overlooked Poland. We are aware of only few international studies which include Poland (i.e., Forbes, Doroszewicz, Card, & Adams-Curtis, 2004; Olson, et al., 2007; Robila & Krishnakumar, 2004). These studies suggest that Poland, when compared to other Eastern European countries, ranks as moderately conservative. Specifically, in terms of gender attitudes tested using samples of men and women aged 18-40, Poland scored more conservative than East Germany but less conservative than Bulgaria and Hungary, as did Slovenia, Russia and the Czech Republic (Robila & Krishnakumar, 2004). In terms of gender role equality tested using student samples, Poland scored as more liberal than Albania, Lithuania, Russia and Croatia but as less liberal than the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, the USA and Slovakia (Olson, et al., 2007). Compared to students of Western nationalities, such as Italians or Germans, Polish students list male and female roles which are more gender-polarized in terms of the traditional division of labour (Boski, Chojnowska, & Koziej, 2007). At the same time, Polish students were positioned as more conservative than those in the United States (Forbes, et al., 2004; Olson, et al., 2007).

To our knowledge, Forbes et al. (2004) is the only example of cross-cultural study into ambivalent sexism specifically which also includes Poland. However, this study focused on ambivalent attitudes toward *women* and tested only female students. Nevertheless, to the extent that hostile and benevolent attitudes to women and men are a compatible set of traditional gender ideologies (as posited by AST and shown in Glick et al., 2004), Forbes et al.'s (2004) study suggests that Poland will score as more benevolent and hostile to men than a Western country such as the United Kingdom.

As discussed above, previous cross-cultural research on ambivalent sexism, combined with AST's assertion that attitudes to men and women are compatible ideologies, informs predictions concerning Poland and South Africa in comparison to the United Kingdom. It is limited, however, in explaining how Poland compares to South Africa. Our analysis of Poland and South Africa's unique but different nature of transition to democracy is useful here. The history of legalized inequality in South Africa as a result of apartheid, compared to a period of forced emancipation in Poland under communism, suggest higher levels of gender inequality (and thus sexism) in the former country prior to their 20 years of democratization. Thus, although no study has made direct comparison of ambivalent attitudes toward *men* in Poland, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, based on the empirical and theoretical literature outlined above, as well as the analysis of their unique socio-political contexts, it could be predicted that these countries may lie along a continuum where South Africa is more sexist than Poland, whilst the United Kingdom is more egalitarian than both. Since HM and BM are compatible ideologies this main effect of country should emerge for both types of sexist attitudes: HM (H1a) and BM (H1b). However, men and women in each country may score differently on specific types of attitudes.

Gender Gap in Attitudes toward Men in Poland, South Africa and the United Kingdom

1 The second central research question concerns how men compare to women on
2 ambivalent attitudes toward men within each of the three countries. There is ample cross-
3 cultural evidence that women are more liberal in their gender attitudes than men. For
4 example, Williams and Best (1990) reported that female students had more progressive
5 gender ideologies than male ones in 14 countries drawn from across North and South
6 America, Africa, Europe, and Asia (Malaysia and Pakistan proved the exception). The few
7 studies which have included Central and Eastern European countries also suggest greater
8 egalitarianism amongst women as compared to men. This was shown for overall gender
9 equality tested among students from Albania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
10 Lithuania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland (Olson, et al., 2007) and for attitudes
11 toward women among students from Croatia, Slovenia and the USA, (Frieze, et al., 2003) as
12 well as among young men and women from the Russia and USA (Levant, et al., 2003).

13 When it comes to ambivalent attitudes to men, the picture is more complex and
14 depends on the type of attitudes. Recent research involving 16 nations has established that in
15 the majority of countries, excluding the United Kingdom, female students express HM to a
16 greater extent than male students (Glick, et al., 2004). Findings regarding BM were, however,
17 more varied. Whilst men rated higher on BM than women in 11 countries, men and women
18 did not differ on BM in the remaining five countries (i.e., Argentina, the United Kingdom,
19 Singapore, Syria, and Colombia). This pattern was largely mirrored in the Ukraine, where
20 female students, compared to male students, held more hostile attitudes toward men but did
21 not differ significantly from men on BM (Yakushko, 2005).

22 AST, which borrows from group and social justice theories, provides an explanation
23 for these differential scores on HM and BM in men and women. For women, their typically
24 higher endorsement of HM than men is indicative of their rejection of male power so as to
25 protect their in-group. Most *men*, on the other hand, are motivated to reject HM (more so than

women) in recognition that it evaluates their gender group negatively. Thus, endorsing hostile attitudes toward men protects female in-group interests, whilst rejecting such hostility protects male in-group interests. This leads to a gender gap on hostile sexism where women outscore men. This main gender effect on HM is indeed seen in most countries (Glick, et al., 2004). Since BM emphasizes men's virtues (their fit-for-higher-status roles and ill-fit for domestic responsibilities), the consistently higher scores of men compared to women on this scale in a majority of countries are not surprising and similarly reflect in-group favouritism. Thus the theory and empirical evidence suggest that women should score higher than men on HM but lower than men on BM. In other words women, compared to men, should be more hostile but less benevolent to men.

However, this may not hold true for all countries. Specifically, the literature further suggests that the main effects of gender and country may be qualified by significant interactions between country and gender. According to AST, the more gender-traditional the country the greater women's motivation to resent male power (as it maintains the unequal status quo). Larger gender gap between men and women, with women scoring higher on HM, is therefore likely. Furthermore, in response to female hostility, men in such conservative countries may be particularly motivated (more so than women) to endorse the in-group favoring BM. Thus, we predict that the gender gap on HM, where women outscore men, should hold for relatively gender-conservative South Africa (H2a) but would not be expected for the relatively liberal United Kingdom. This was apparent in Glick et al. (2004) where British male students scored equally as low as British female students on HM. This prediction would be confirmed by a significant gender x country interaction, and when followed up, would return significant simple effect of gender for South Africa.

According to AST, the in-group favouritism, manifested by men scoring higher on *BM* than women, should hold for more conservative South Africa (H2b) but would not be

1 expected for the egalitarian United Kingdom. This prediction, similarly, would be supported
2 by a significant gender x country interaction where the simple effect of gender would reach
3 significance in South Africa. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the gender gap on BM in
4 the United Kingdom is non-significant (Glick et al. 2004). Although the authors do not
5 provide explanation for this phenomenon, it is possible that the more gender-liberal a
6 country, the less tension—or greater agreement—there is between men and women regarding
7 BM. Since the reviewed literature suggests that Poland might be moderately conservative, it
8 is difficult to predict the nature of the gender gap on HM or BM in this country based on
9 AST. It will therefore be explored rather than predicted here.

10 In summary, we predict that:

11 H1a (main effect of country for hostility to men): Students in South Africa will be
12 significantly more hostile to men than those in Poland, whilst the British students will be
13 significantly less hostile to men than both other samples.

14 H1b (main effect of country for benevolence to men): Students in South Africa will be
15 significantly more benevolent to men than those in Poland, whilst the British students will be
16 significantly less benevolent to men than both other samples.

17 H2a (gender x country interaction for hostility to men): Female students will be
18 significantly more hostile to men than male students in South Africa.

19 H2b (gender x country interaction for benevolence to men): Female students will be
20 significantly less benevolent to men than male students in South Africa

21 **Method**

22 *Participants*

23 Student participants were recruited through means such as campus leaflets and e-
24 mails. They were offered remuneration for their time. Our initial samples consisted of 175
25 British undergraduate students (48% females and 52% of males), 193 Polish students (53%

females and 47% of males) and 190 South African students (38% females and 62% of males). Since the age range in the United Kingdom was considerably higher than in Poland and South Africa ($sds=5.09$, 2.66 and 2.22 respectively) and age is known to be linked to sexism (Dorius & Alwin, 2010; Scott, 2006; Swim, et al., 2005) 14 participants aged 30 or more were removed from further analyses. Even though all analyses with and without these participants return the same results it was thought that removing them will aid comparisons with other student samples in the future. This reduced the samples by nine participants in the United Kingdom (four women and five men), three (males) in Poland and two (of each gender) in South Africa resulting in total of 544 participants (see Table 1 for the demographic profile of this reduced sample).

Sample 1: United Kingdom. Data from 166 British undergraduate students (48% females and 52% of males) from Royal Holloway, University of London and the University of Winchester were included in the analyses. They averaged 19.5 years of age, ranging from 18 to 29 ($sd=1.96$). Nearly 85% of them identified as White, followed by 8.4% Asian, 4.2% mixed, 1.8% Black and .6% of unknown ethnic origin. Most studied social sciences (including psychology) and arts (79.2%), followed by joint programmes (15.3%), science (3.6%), and unknown subjects (1.8%).

Sample 2: Poland. Data from 190 Polish students (54% females and 46% of males) from Gdansk University were included in the analyses. They averaged 21.73 years of age, ranging from 19 to 28 ($sd=1.78$). All were White; the majority were recruited from the psychology and arts departments (83.6%), whilst the remaining studied science (10.6%), joint programmes (4.2%), and unknown subjects (1.6%).

Sample 3: South Africa. Data from 188 South African students (38% females and 62% of males) from the University of Cape Town were included in the analyses. They averaged 20.52 years of age, ranging from 18 to 26 ($sd=1.70$). Nearly 40% identified as 'coloured or

1 mixed,' 27.2% as White, 12.2% as Asian, 11.8% as unknown or other, and 8.6% as Black.

2 Students were recruited from psychology, other social sciences and arts (51.5%), sciences
3 (42.6%), joint programmes (2.1%), and unknown subjects (3.7%).

4 *Comparability of Sample Characteristics*

5 The samples were comparable in terms of education (they were all university
6 students). They differed in age, with the Polish sample being oldest ($M=21.73$) followed by
7 South African ($M=20.52$) and British ($M=19.50$) samples, $F(2,544)=52.90$, $p<.001$. This
8 reflects differences in educational systems: Polish students start their higher education at the
9 age of 19 (instead of 18) and study for their first university degree for five (instead of three)
10 years. In the UK on the other hand there are more mature students (i.e. older than 21) than in
11 South Africa.

12 The samples were comparable in terms of gender distribution, which was close to
13 equal except for South Africa, where males were slightly overrepresented (62%). Analyses on
14 randomly selected gender-balanced samples returned the same findings as the analyses
15 reported below, thus confirming the comparability of these samples in terms of participants'
16 gender. Each sample included only nationals of the tested country.

17 As expected, the samples differed in terms of ethnic origin. Typically for their
18 nationality, the Polish sample was 100% White, compared to 84.9% in the United Kingdom
19 and 27.2% in South Africa. There was a higher percentage of 'Coloured or Mixed' (39.8%)
20 and Asian (12.2%) participants in South African than in the British sample (4.2% and 8.4%
21 respectively). In the United Kingdom 1.8% (compared to 8.5% in South Africa) identified as
22 Black, but 11.8% in the South African sample did not identify their ethnic origin. Luyt (2005)
23 suggests that participants in South Africa may be particularly sensitive to such classification
24 due to the country's history of legalized race discrimination and therefore more unwilling to
25 classify themselves as belonging to specific population groups.

Whilst the majority of participants in Poland (83.6%) and the United Kingdom (79.2%) studied psychology and other art subjects, in South Africa only 51.5% of participants were recruited from these departments. The samples also differed in the number of science students (42.6% in South Africa, 10.6% in Poland, and 3.6% in the United Kingdom) and joint programme students (15.3% in the United Kingdom, 4.2% in Poland, and 2.1% in South Africa).

The distribution of participants across the various demographic categories was additionally analysed as a function of gender and country using hierarchical three-way loglinear analyses. These returned significant second and third order effects showing predictable differences in demographic profiles and reflecting typical demographics of student samples in the three countries (see Table 1).

— Insert Table 1 about here —

Design and Procedure

A 3 (country: the United Kingdom, Poland, South Africa) x 2 (participants' gender: male vs. female) between-subjects design was adopted where dependent variables included hostile and benevolent attitudes toward men.

Individuals participated in small groups, and each participant was provided with a booklet containing an information sheet with a cover story (i.e., the supposed purpose of the study was to validate one of the tools measuring gender attitudes), a consent form, the Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (AMI, Glick & Fiske, 1999), and a debriefing note which explained the real purpose of the study. The session took approximately 30 minutes.

Measures

Glick and Fiske's (1999) AMI was used to measure sexist attitudes toward men. This is arguably one of the more sensitive explicit measures of attitudes toward men which is currently available (Glick & Fiske, 1999; Glick, et al., 2004). This tool contains a six-point

Likert-type response format (0-disagree strongly; 5-agree strongly), where 20 items measure hostile and benevolent attitudes to men. Evidence for AMI's discriminant and convergent validity has been provided by Glick and Fiske (1999), and evidence for its cross-cultural validity has been provided by Glick et al. (2004). The scale was administered in English in South Africa and the United Kingdom and translated into Polish for use in Poland. The Polish translation was back-translated into English, and any ambiguities in the translation were resolved via discussion (see the Appendix for the translations and Table 2 for the original item wording).

In order to test invariance, a replicatory factor analysis was conducted following Ben-Porath's (1990) recommendation: The same factor analytic procedure with Varimax solution and forced two-factor extraction was conducted for each sample. A two-factor solution was favoured over the alternative six-factor solution (Glick & Fiske, 1999) to aid comparability with the vast majority of cross-cultural studies which use the AMI. The factorial solutions largely confirmed the original HM and BM factors. Factorial, or metric, invariance was formally tested and supported with Tucker's (1951) phi coefficient of congruence. The phi values indicated that Polish and South African factors were highly similar to the British ones exceeding even the most conservative cut off point of .95 (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1994). In order to improve metric invariance, item 20 was removed from all later analyses as it loaded substantively (above .45) on an opposite factor (i.e., HM instead of BM) in Poland and in South Africa, and equally strongly on both factors in the United Kingdom. See Table 2 for relevant factor loadings, phi and precise Cronbach's alpha coefficients as well as the items' wording.

— Insert Table 2 about here —

The Hostility toward Men subscale (HM) was used to capture hostile gender attitudes toward men. This consisted of ten items. Scores were obtained by averaging responses to

individual items. The higher the average score, the higher an individual's hostility to men. Reliability scores reported by Glick and Fiske (1999) ranged between .81 and .86. Similar satisfactory Cronbach Alpha scores emerged for each country in the current study: $\alpha_{UK} = .81$; $\alpha_{PL} = .71$; $\alpha_{SA} = .80$.

The Benevolence toward Men subscale (BM) was used to capture benevolent gender attitudes toward men. This consisted of nine items, (after item 20 was removed as explained above). Again, scores were obtained by averaging responses to individual items and, thus, the higher the average score, the higher an individual's benevolence to men. Reliability coefficients reported by Glick and Fiske (1999) ranged between .79 and .83. Cronbach Alpha scores emerging in the current study were also satisfactory: $\alpha_{UK} = .84$; $\alpha_{PL} = .85$; $\alpha_{SA} = .80$.

Results

In order to avoid Type I error, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for both measures of attitudes to men (HM and BM) was conducted by country and gender. As Table 3 illustrates, participants' mean scores ranged from a minimum of 1.79 to a maximum of 3.08. Given that the possible range is 0 (no endorsement) to 5 (complete endorsement), in absolute terms this indicates relatively low endorsement of ambivalent attitudes in the three samples. The multivariate test statistic using Pillai's trace indicated that there were significant main effects of country, $V = .11$, $F(4, 1076) = 15.17$, $p < .001$, gender, $V = .21$, $F(2, 537) = 69.95$, $p < .001$, and country x gender interaction, $V = .10$, $F(4, 1076) = 14.21$, $p < .001$, on both types of attitudes. Separate univariate ANOVAs on the outcome variables are reported below in an order consistent with the hypotheses. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.

— Insert Table 3 about here —

Comparison of Three Countries on Benevolent and Hostile Attitudes to Men

Hypothesis 1a predicted that South African participants would be more hostile to men than those in Poland, whilst individuals in the United Kingdom would be less hostile than

both. This was tested with a main effect of country on HM and confirmed. The follow-up analysis for the significant main country effect on HM, $F(2,543)=22.27$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.076$, revealed that, indeed, whilst both the British ($M=2.06$) and Polish ($M=2.35$) respondents rated significantly lower than South African ones ($M=2.64$, $p<.001$ and $p<.05$ respectively), the British and Polish samples also differed significantly ($p<.01$). That is, all countries were aligned along a continuum of hostile attitudes with the United Kingdom being least hostile and South Africa most hostile as predicted.

Hypothesis 1b predicted a similar pattern for BM (South African participants scoring highest and Polish lowest) and this was partially confirmed by the test of main country effect. The follow-up for the significant main country effect on BM, $F(2,543)=14.63$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.052$, indicated that Polish ($M=2.50$) and South African ($M=2.41$) samples both rated significantly higher on BM than the British sample ($M=1.98$, both $p<.001$) whilst Poland and South Africa did not differ significantly from each other ($p=.379$). Thus, with regard to BM, the continuum was somewhat shortened, with both Poland and South Africa occupying the more conservative spectrum opposite the more liberal United Kingdom.

Testing Gender Differences across Countries

Hypothesis 2a predicted that the gender gap, where women outscore men on hostile attitudes, will emerge for South Africa. Hypothesis 2b, on the other hand, stated that women will underscore men on benevolent attitudes in this country. These predictions were tested with gender x country interaction effects. While the analysis revealed that women generally scored higher on HM ($M=2.57$) than men ($M=2.13$), $F(1,543)=38.92$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.070$, and lower on BM ($M=2.03$) than men ($M=2.57$), $F(1,543)=41.96$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.072$, these main effects were indeed qualified by complex country x gender interaction effects. These emerged for both HM, $F(2,543)=17.24$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.060$, and BM, $F(2,543)=8.16$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.029$. As will be seen below, their nature was as expected for BM (H2b – confirmed) and for

HM (H2a – confirmed) in South Africa. Interesting findings emerged also for United Kingdom and Poland (see Table 2).

A follow-up analysis, with one-tailed independent *t* tests, was conducted within each country on HM. It revealed significant differences between women and men for the United Kingdom and South Africa, $t(163)=4.06, p<.001$ and $t(187)=6.66, p<.001$ (respectively), but not for Poland, $t(188)=-.99, p=.322$. Both British and South African women scored higher on HM ($M_{UK}=2.33$ and $M_{SA}=3.08$) than men in these countries ($M_{UK}=1.79$ and $M_{SA}=2.21$ - see Figure 1). Thus Hypothesis 2a, that a gender gap would exist in South Africa, was confirmed. A similar significant gender gap was somewhat surprisingly also observed in the United Kingdom. No significant gender gap emerged in Poland.

— Insert Figure 1 about here —

Similar follow-up analyses with one-tailed independent tests were conducted within each country on BM and revealed a different pattern from the one obtained on HM scores (see Figure 2). That is, consistent with H2b, men scored higher on BM than women in South Africa ($M_M=2.81$ vs. $M_W=2.02$), $t(164.91)=-5.66, p<.001$. Gender differences in BM did not emerge in the United Kingdom, $t(163)=-.35, p=.726$. However, in Poland, a gender gap of the same nature as in South Africa was revealed ($M_M=2.89$ vs. $M_W=2.11$), $t(188)=-5.94, p<.001$.

— Insert Figure 2 about here —

Discussion

The main aim of this study was to address the gap in cross-cultural research concerning the nature of sexism. We did so by testing student attitudes toward men in two under-researched countries under transition, Poland and South Africa, and comparing them to gender attitudes in more heavily researched, gender-egalitarian long-standing democracy of the United Kingdom. Two key research questions were posed: (1) How do these countries

compare on benevolent and hostile attitudes toward men, and (2), How do men compare to women in terms of attitudes toward men within each of the three countries? Answers are discussed below.

The Nature of Sexist Attitudes toward Men in Poland, South Africa, and the United Kingdom

Based on analysis of the countries' socio-political context, the AST and overview of previous research it was hypothesized that British participants would be most liberal, followed by Polish and South African participants in terms of both types of attitudes toward men. Our findings largely supported these predictions. The expected pattern of differences emerged for hostile attitudes. However, Polish and South African participants were equally benevolent to men and significantly more so than in the United Kingdom. This lack of significant differences on BM between Poland and South Africa, though not expected, is consistent with AST's notion that in more hostile-sexist countries there is the need to 'sweeten' reality with more evaluatively positive BM. That is to say, BM rationalizes the gender differences in status and makes them easier to accept, and in so doing maintains the status quo (Glick, et al., 2004). The significant difference between scores from South Africa and the United Kingdom provide further support for the relative gender-conservatism of the South African sample and gender-egalitarianism of the British sample. It also resonates with the socio-political profile of each country, where values of equality are well established in the old democracy of the United Kingdom, but still struggle against the legacy of deeply rooted inequality in South Africa.

The somewhat inconsistent results from Poland, which occupies a moderate position on hostility but a rather conservative one on benevolence, may be explained by: (a) the need to reject the enforced emancipation of communism as well as the dissatisfaction with the re-masculinisation of the new capitalism as seen in scores on hostility to men, and (2) the related

1 need to return to femininity (LaFont, 2001; Yakushko, 2005) as seen in scores on
2 benevolence to men. Further studies could fruitfully test these possibilities directly.

3 As argued earlier, the emerging cross-cultural pattern is not necessarily shared equally
4 by men and women within each of the three countries.

5 *Gender Gap in Attitudes to Men across the Three Countries*

6 As predicted, the main gender effects reported in the literature, where women score
7 higher than men on HM but lower than men on BM (Glick et al., 2004), were qualified by
8 interactions between country and gender. Indeed, the prediction of women's greater (than
9 men's) hostility to men held for the most gender-conservative South Africa (in line with
10 H2a). This confirms AST's contention that the higher the gender conservatism, the more
11 reasons for women to be hostile toward men. However, unexpectedly, the same pattern also
12 held for the most egalitarian United Kingdom. This finding also contradicts earlier
13 observations reported by Glick et al. (2004) for this country. Thus, despite United Kingdom's
14 relative gender liberalism, British women still seem to resent male power. It is possible that
15 this very resentment has a preventive function and is a reaction to the observed slowdown in
16 egalitarian trends (Blau, et al., 2006; Dorius & Alwin, 2010; Scott, 2006) and the reported
17 threat of return to sexism (Braun & Scott, 2009; Crompton, et al., 2005; Walter, 2010).
18 Although the United Kingdom scores amongst the most egalitarian countries, a gender gap in
19 wages of 19.8% was still reported in 2010 by the Office for National Statistics ("Office for
20 National Statistics", 2011). This reflects a drop from 22% in 2009—the biggest since 1997.
21 However, in terms of equal pay, the United Kingdom's ranking was 81st out of 130 countries
22 in 2008 and its overall gender equality worldwide ranking fell from 9th position in 2006 to
23 13th in 2008 (Zahidi & Ibarra, 2010). Thus, British women may embrace hostile attitudes to
24 men in an attempt to protect relative gender-egalitarianism and prevent the return of sexism.

1 With regard to BM, hypothesis H2b was confirmed: Women's lower (than men's)
2 endorsement of BM held for South Africa. Such a gender gap did not emerge in the United
3 Kingdom—a finding which is consistent with Glick et al. (2004). Taken together, these
4 findings are congruent with the theoretical argument of in-group favouritism. According to
5 Glick et al. (2004), men, particularly in more gender-conservative countries (such as South
6 Africa and, perhaps, Poland here), should be especially motivated to endorse benevolent
7 beliefs as they act to maintain the subordinate position of women. For example, admitting
8 that men need women's care rewards women for taking on traditional maternal and serving
9 roles even though it confirms men's weaknesses. The lack of the gender gap in the United
10 Kingdom may be due to fewer tensions, and therefore greater agreement, between men and
11 women in more gender-egalitarian countries—at least with regard to benevolent forms of
12 sexism.

13 The Polish sample was the only one of the three where no gender gap was detected on
14 HM. This also diverges from the general cross-cultural pattern detected by Glick et al.
15 (2004), where women outscored men on HM. However, the gender gap on BM was similar to
16 the one found in South Africa, where Polish men outscored Polish women on benevolence to
17 men. The unique character of Polish transition may be responsible for these findings.
18 Women's lower scores on hostility to men may reflect the rejection of feminism. It should be
19 noted that HM is not a form of feminism as, unlike feminism, it serves to maintain rather than
20 challenge the status quo (Glick, et al., 2004; Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002). Yet
21 expressing hostility to men and resentment of their power may be *perceived* as feminist
22 sentiments. Polish women may be particularly reluctant to express such attitudes because of
23 the historic associations of feminism with communism and its enforced emancipation.
24 Indeed, it is argued that legalization of emancipation in Poland did not equate to the actual
25 emancipation of women and, in fact, stifled the development of feminism in Poland

(Ksiniewicz, 2004). For example, Polish women were encouraged to join the workforce but were not given the opportunity to advance their career on equal terms with men. This artificial emancipation placed triple burden on women's shoulders: the requirement to be a good mother, employee and social activist (LaFont, 2001). Some theorists also attribute negative attitudes to feminism in Poland to other historical factors. In the second half of the 18th century Poland underwent prolonged partition and ceased to exist as a country for 122 years. It is argued that the only way in which the Poles could maintain their national identity was via an emphasis on family and Polish tradition (Rosner, 1997). The idealized image of 'Matka Polka'—directly translated as the 'Mother Pole'—promoted at that time required women's full commitment to family as an expression of support for Polish national identity and fight for independence. Any feminist sentiments, which are based on the betterment of the individual (read 'women' in this instance) rather than on the good of the country, were perceived as the betrayal of the Polish cause (Ksiniewicz, 2004). Since benevolence toward men does not appear feminist, and by association communist, Polish women were not inhibited from expressing BM. However, this pattern of findings differs from the one found in Ukraine, the only other Eastern European country where ambivalence to men was measured. Yakushko (2005) reported higher hostility in female students compared to male students but no gender differences on BM. This finding is complicated by the fact that, unlike here, AMI was administered to Ukrainian students in English instead of their native language. Thus, more studies are needed to test our post hoc explanation directly and to determine whether our findings are unique to Poland or shared by other Eastern European countries.

The gender gap pattern found on HM in the South African and in the British samples is typically found in other countries (Glick, et al., 2004). The pattern found in Poland, being almost a mirror image of the two other countries, is unusual. However, taken together with the scores on BM, the different attitudinal patterns emerging in each country can still serve

important social functions—including system justification—even though not always in the way predicted by AST. Specifically, the traditional explanation proposed by Glick et al. (2004) seems to apply especially in the case of South Africa. That is, women's hostility to men is indicative of female resentment of male hostility toward them (Glick, et al., 2000). In such cases, it is in men's in-group interest to reject such a belief, which is seen in their lower (than women's) scores on HM and higher scores on BM. This may be a particularly adaptive strategy in countries such as South Africa, where the transition to democracy represents a response to previous severe inequality, and embraces values of gender equality sufficiently so as to allow women to express hostile sexism freely. Men's low hostility to men, and emphasis on their own benevolence, may appear in step with the democratic emphasis on equality in contemporary South Africa. For females, on the other hand, higher hostility and lower benevolence toward men is in keeping with the spirit of fighting for their equality.

In Poland, however, expressing hostility to men may be socially stigmatized as indicative of feminism and thus, by association, of enforced emancipation under communism (LaFont, 2001). In such case, system justification has to rest solely on the benevolent elements of sexism because of their greater acceptability. Indeed, Polish men embrace benevolent set of beliefs more than women. By taking such a position, men may attempt to reward those women who comply with this benevolent image (that is, those who do attend to their needs and care for them). At the same time, they can withdraw reward from those women who fail to comply with it (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; Glick, et al., 2004; Viki & Abrams, 2004). Thus, it is possible that BM allows Polish men to maintain the status quo without being accused of communist sentiments. On the part of Polish women, low benevolence to men may be the only acceptable, and historically adaptive, way of expressing discontent with the status quo without the risk of encouraging another era of enforced emancipation.

1 In the liberal United Kingdom, where women are less dependent on men, endorsing
2 benevolent beliefs may have little regulatory use for men. Firm rejection of hostile attitudes
3 and low endorsement of benevolent attitudes among men are indicative of their relatively
4 liberal and sexism-free attitudes. In this case, women's higher than men's hostility toward
5 men may serve the function of guarding against (the return of) sexism and thus maintaining
6 egalitarianism, rather than reacting to the men's hostility to women as per the original
7 explanation proposed by Glick et al. (2004) and evident in the South Africa above. Thus,
8 egalitarian gender attitudes may be maintained by women's hostility to men. Further research
9 is required to explicitly explore the possible, and culturally varied, mechanisms of
10 maintaining and challenging the status quo.

11 There are two limitations to the generalisability of our findings. First is the choice of
12 student samples. Whilst it is common practice (in fact, the majority of the studies reviewed
13 here used mostly student samples) and thus helps to increase comparability across countries,
14 it compromises the generalisability of the findings outside the student population. It is likely
15 that the relative gender egalitarianism of our samples, where most scores fall below the scale
16 midpoint of 3.00, is greater than that of other, older or less educated, social groups from the
17 respective countries (Dorius & Alwin, 2010; Scott, 2006; Swim, et al., 2005). Thus, further
18 research could fruitfully improve the current understanding of cross-cultural gender attitudes
19 by testing individuals from various walks of life. This is particularly relevant to South Africa,
20 arguably, the most diverse country of the three examined here.

21 Second, although the most recent scales of attitudes toward men were used here, these
22 were still self-report measures, which are prone to social desirability effects, and thus may
23 have returned optimistically liberal scores. Although their improved psychometric properties
24 are generally recognized (Swim, et al., 2005), they are nonetheless criticized for being too
25 overt and insufficiently sensitive (Nelson, 2002)—an issue mainly for the egalitarian United

Kingdom. Although we have used a cover story with the aim of preventing social desirability effects, the use of implicit measures of gender attitudes (e.g., the Implicit Associations Test, Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; Rudman & Kilianski, 2000) could be employed in future investigations and compared cross-nationally to the scores on explicit tools in order to address this issue directly. Furthermore, the two under-researched countries here both happen to be undergoing socio-economic transition and were compared to a single example of well-established democracy. In order to better understand the nature of attitudes to men in countries undergoing transition, more such countries need to be included in future investigations. This could also be fruitfully accompanied by similar investigations into hostile and benevolent attitudes toward *women*, an important component of sexist gender role ideology (Glick & Fiske, 1996).

Conclusion

This research was conducted in order to address the gap in the cross-cultural literature on attitudes toward men, particularly in under-researched countries which may be described as ‘societies in transition’. This was achieved by examining hostile and benevolent attitudes toward *men* in student samples from two such countries, Poland and South Africa, and by comparing them to student samples from the gender-egalitarian and well-established democracy of the United Kingdom. This study has added to our current body of knowledge by comparing these three countries directly for the first time and by emphasizing that the emerging pattern of findings depends upon socio-political context, on the type of attitudes (i.e., benevolent vs. hostile), and is qualified by interactions between country and gender. Our work also suggests that hostile and benevolent attitudes may serve more than the one function of system justification and that there might be more than one way to maintain the status quo, which may be dependent on culture—a possibility which awaits further investigation.

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1 Table 1

2 *Comparison of Demographic Profile of the Samples by Country and Gender.*

	United Kingdom		Poland		South Africa	
	F	M	F	M	F	M
Number of participants	78 (48)	86 (52)	102 (54)	88 (46)	70 (38)	118 (62)
	166		190		188	
Age (mean years)	19.10	19.86	21.75	21.70	20.20	20.71
	19.50 ^a		21.73 ^b		20.52 ^c	
Ethnic origin						
White	63 (38.2)	77 (46.7)	102 (53.7)	88 (46.3)	5 (2.7)	46 (24.5)
Black	2 (1.2)	1 (.6)	0	0	6 (3.2)	10 (5.3)
Asian	8 (4.8)	6 (3.6)	0	0	10 (5.3)	13 (6.9)
mixed	4 (2.4)	3 (1.8)	0	0	39 (20.7)	36(19.1)
unknown	1 (.6)	0	0	0	11(5.9)	11(5.9)
other	0	0	0	0	0	1 (.5)
Course of study						
Social sciences & arts	64 (39)	66 (40.2)	93 (49.2)	65(34.4)	51(26.8)	47 (24.7)
science	2 (1.2)	4(2.4)	1 (.5)	19 (10.1)	20 (10.5)	61(32.1)
joined	8 (4.9)	17 (10.4)	7 (3.7)	1 (.5)	0	4 (2.1)
unknown	3(1.8)	0	0	3 (1.6)	0	7 (3.7)

Note: Percentages are in parentheses. Means within a row with different superscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$. Three-way hierarchical loglinear analyses were conducted on counts to test for main and interaction effects of gender and country on: (1) ethnic origin, and (2) course of study separately. The likelihood ratio for both models was $\chi^2(0)=0$, $p=1$ indicating perfect goodness of fit in both cases. For the former only second order interactions were significant: country x gender, $\chi^2(2)=33.22$, $p < .001$; country x ethnicity, $\chi^2(10)=342.79$, $p < .001$; and gender x ethnicity, $\chi^2(5)=26.87$, $p < .001$. For the latter 3-way interactions reached significance: $\chi^2(6)=28.78$, $p < .001$. Thus, in both cases the gender x country groups differed significantly on specific levels of ethnicity and course of study in complex ways. E.g., as illustrated by the counts per cell above, there were more White men than White women in the South Africa sample; and more men than women studied sciences in Poland and South Africa.

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- 1 Table 2
- 2 *Invariance Analysis: Results of Factor Analyses with Varimax rotation and Forced Two-Factor*
- 3 *Extraction along with Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Coefficients and Tucker's Factor Congruity phi*
- 4 *Coefficients in South Africa (SA), Poland (PL) and the United Kingdom (UK)*

Items (and the scale they originally belonged to as in Glick & Fiske, 1999)	SA loadings		PL loadings		UK loadings	
	HM	BM	HM	BM	HM	BM
1. Even if both members of a couple work, the woman ought to be more attentive to taking care of her man at home. (BM)		.645		.694		.644
2. A man who is sexually attracted to a woman typically has no morals about doing whatever it takes to get her in bed. (HM)	.582		.396		.434	
3. Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies than women are. (BM)		.302		.690		.554
4. When men act to "help" women, they are often trying to prove they are better than women. (HM)	.611		.336	.384	.560	
5. Every woman needs a male partner who will cherish her. (BM)		.641		.703		.672
6. Men would be lost in this world if women weren't there to guide them. (HM)	.414		.496		.580	
7. A woman will never truly be fulfilled in life if she doesn't have a committed, long term relationship with a man. (BM)		.727		.708		.737
8. Men act like babies when they are ill. (HM)	.698		.530		.743	
9. Men always fight to have greater control in society than women. (HM)	.676		.576		.668	
10. Men are mainly useful to provide financial security for women. (BM)		.544		.472		.480
11. Even men who claim to be sensitive to women's rights really want a traditional relationship at home, with the woman performing most of the housekeeping and childcare. (HM)	.444		.450	.438	.425	.475
12. Every woman ought to have a man she adores. (BM)		.534		.590		.705
13. Men are more willing to put themselves in danger to protect others. (BM)		.650		.716		.692
14. Men usually try to dominate conversations when talking to women. (HM)	.486		.363		.527	
15. Most men pay lip service to equality for women, but can't handle having a woman as an equal. (HM)	.723		.635		.806	
16. Women are incomplete without men. (BM)		.778		.713		.720
17. When it comes down to it, most men are really like children. (HM)	.591		.692		.649	
18. Men are more willing to take risks than women. (BM)		.629		.612		.551
19. Most men sexually harass women, even if only in subtle ways, once they are in position of power over them. (HM)	.674		.451		.517	
20. Women ought to take care of their men at home, because men would fall apart if they had to fend for themselves. (BM)	.586	.352	.460		.504	.501
% if Variance	23.55	15.76	11.48	25.96	12.64	30.64
Tucker's phi (coefficient of factor congruity with UK factors)	.975	.955	.981	.966		
Reliability (after item 20 removed)	.80	.80	.71	.85	.80	.84

Note: Loadings below .30 were suppressed. The meaning of the abbreviations is as follows: PL – Poland, SA –

South Africa, UK – United Kingdom, HM – Hostility to Men, BM – Benevolence to Men.


Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Three Countries and Two Gender Groups for Hostile and Benevolent Attitudes Toward Men

Measure	<i>Hostility</i>			<i>Benevolence</i>		
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n
United Kingdom						
Females	2.33 ^a	.09	78	1.95 ^a	.98	78
Males	1.79 ^b	.09	87	2.00 ^a	1.03	87
Poland						
Females	2.30 ^a	.08	101	2.11 ^a	.87	101
Males	2.40 ^a	.09	88	2.90 ^c	.94	88
South Africa						
Females	3.08 ^c	.10	70	2.02 ^a	.86	70
Males	2.21 ^a	.07	119	2.81 ^c	1.02	119

Note: Scale endpoints for both Hostile and Benevolent attitude scales were 0 (disagree strongly) and 5 (agree strongly). The higher the score the higher level of hostility or benevolence respectively. Means with different superscripts within a column are significantly different at $p<.05$.

1 Figure 1

2 *Hostility Toward Men as a Function of Country and Participants' Gender*



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
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1 Figure 2

2 *Benevolence Toward Men as a Function of Country and Participants' Gender*



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- 1 List of captions for illustrations:
- 2 Figure 1: *Hostility Toward Men as a Function of Country and Participants' Gender*
- 3 Figure 2: *Benevolence Toward Men as a Function of Country and Participants' Gender*
- 4

Appendix

Translation of Glick and Fiske's (1999) Ambivalence to Men Inventory into Polish and back-translation into English.

Item No	Polish translation	Back-translation from Polish to English
1.	Nawet jeśli oboje partnerzy pracują kobieta powinna bardziej troszczyć się w domu o swojego mężczyznę.	Even if both partners work, it is the woman who should take greater care for her man at home.
2.	Mężczyzna, który pożąda seksualnie kobiety zwykle nie na skrupułów i zrobi wszystko, żeby zaciągnąć ją do łóżka.	A man who is sexually attracted to a woman usually does not have any scruples and would do anything to get her in bed.
3.	Mężczyźni prawdopodobnie rzadziej załamują się w sytuacjach kryzysowych niż kobiety.	Men usually break down more seldom in crisis than do women.
4.	Kiedy mężczyźni robią coś, żeby „pomóc” kobietom często próbują udowodnić że są lepsi niż kobiety.	When men do things with the aim to ‘help’ women they normally are trying to prove that they are better than women.
5.	Każda kobieta potrzebuje partnera-mężczyzny, który otoczy ją czułą opieką.	Every woman needs a male partner who will care tenderly for her.
6.	Mężczyźni zagubiliby się w tym świecie gdyby nie było kobiet, które nimi kierują.	Men would get lost in this world if there were no women to guide them.
7.	Kobieta nigdy nie będzie całkowicie spełniona jeżeli nie będzie w stałym stabilnym związku z mężczyzną.	A woman will never be completely fulfilled if she does not have a committed, long-term relationship with a man.
8.	Mężczyźni zachowują się jak niemowlęta kiedy są chorzy.	Men behave like babies when they are ill.
9.	Mężczyźni będą zawsze walczyć aby mieć większą władzę w społeczeństwie niż kobiety.	Men will always fight for greater power in society than women.
10.	Mężczyźni są głównie przydatni aby zapewnić kobietom bezpieczeństwo finansowe.	Men are mainly useful in providing financial security for women.
11.	Nawet mężczyźni, którzy deklarują wrażliwość w kwestii praw kobiet w rzeczywistości w domu chcą tradycyjnego związku, gdzie kobieta wykonuje większość domowych prac i opiekuje się dziećmi.	Even those men who say they are sensitive to women's rights, in reality want traditional relationship at home where women do most housework and care for children.
12.	Każda kobieta powinna mieć mężczyznę, którego uwielbia.	Every woman should have a man she adores.
13.	Mężczyźni są bardziej skłonni narażać się na niebezpieczeństwo, żeby ochraniać innych.	Men are more willing to put themselves in danger to protect others.
14.	Mężczyźni zwykle próbują dominować w rozmowach z kobietami.	Men normally try to dominate in conversations with women.
15.	Większość mężczyzn składa głośne deklaracje o równouprawnieniu kobiet, jednak nie potrafią odnaleźć się w sytuacji w których kobiety są im równe.	Most men declare that they support women's equality but cannot deal with situations when women are equal to them.
16.	Kobiety bez mężczyzn są niepełne.	Women are incomplete without men.
17.	Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, większość mężczyzn jest jak dzieci.	Generally speaking, most men are like children really.
18.	Mężczyźni podejmują ryzyko chętniej niż kobiety.	Men take risks more willingly than women.
19.	Większość mężczyzn napastuje kobiety seksualnie, nawet jeśli robią to w subtelny sposób, jeżeli zajmą pozycję która daje im władzę nad kobietami.	Most men sexually harass women, even if subtly, once they find themselves in a position of power over women.
20.	Kobiety powinny w domu opiekować się swoimi mężczyznami, ponieważ mężczyźni załamałby się gdyby mieli sami dawać sobie radę.	Women should take care of their men at home as men would break down if they were to look after themselves on their own.

